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FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS:
MAINTAINING JAIL SECURITY WHILE STRIPPING DETAINEES
OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
NINA GLEIBERMAN ∗
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 1 the Supreme Court of the
United States considered whether a strip search policy conducted on
a pretrial detainee—before entering the general jail population for a
2
3
minor traffic-related offense—violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The Court deferred to the judgment of correc4
tional officials who devised the search policies and held that the strip
search was constitutional, striking a balance between inmate privacy
5
and the security needs of correctional institutions.
Although maintaining safety at detention centers requires the
expertise of correctional officials, the Supreme Court, in Florence, gave
too much discretion to detention center administrators to develop
search policies, and the Court improperly balanced the need for the
6
strip searches against detainees’ privacy interests. As a result of its
unlimited deference to the judgment of correctional institution administrators, the Court disregarded the importance of a reasonable
7
suspicion standard for conducting such intrusive searches. The Supreme Court should have limited institutional discretion in determinCopyright © 2013 by Nina Gleibermann.
∗
J.D. Candidate, 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The
author wishes to thank Professors Michael Millemann and Lee Kovarsky for their invaluable feedback throughout the development of this Note. She also thanks her editors,
Thomas Kolkin, Shari Silver, and Christine White, for their insightful comments and advice. Finally, the author is grateful to her friends and family, especially her mother Haleh
Gleiberman, for their support and encouragement throughout law school.
1. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) [hereinafter Florence III].
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects people from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fourth
Amendment into the Due Process Clause, rendering the Fourth Amendment enforceable
against states. See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Amendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 257, 257 (1984) (noting that in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), the Supreme Court “ruled that substantive [F]ourth [A]mendment law, by ‘incorporation’ into
the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, applied with full force to state law enforcement authorities”).
4. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1513–14.
5. Id. at 1523.
6. See infra Part IV.A.
7. See infra Part IV.B.
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ing intake procedures, specifically strip searches performed on individuals arrested for minor offenses prior to their admittance to the
8
jail’s general population. These limitations should reflect recommended policies of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), which incorporate a reasonable suspicion standard for conducting strip
searches on people who have committed minor crimes, such as the
9
detainee in Florence.
I. THE CASE
On March 3, 2005, Albert Florence, his wife, and his son were
traveling on Interstate Highway 295 in Burlington County, New Jersey,
10
when a state trooper stopped their vehicle for a traffic infraction.
Florence’s wife was driving, but Florence identified himself as the
11
owner of the vehicle. After the trooper conducted a records search,
he discovered that Florence was the subject of an outstanding bench
12
warrant in Essex County, New Jersey. The warrant was issued on
April 25, 2003, and charged Florence with a form of civil contempt (a
13
non-indictable offense) for failure to pay a fine. Florence informed
the trooper that the warrant was invalid because he had already paid
14
the fine. Additionally, Florence presented the trooper with a copy of
15
a letter confirming that the fine had been paid. Nonetheless the

8. See infra Part IV.C.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492,
496 (D.N.J. 2009) [hereinafter Florence I], rev’d, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010).
11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-945),
2011 WL 220710.
12. Id. Seven years prior to this incident, Florence was arrested after fleeing from police, and he was charged with obstruction of justice and use of a deadly weapon. He entered a guilty plea to a lesser offense and was sentenced to pay a fine on a monthly basis.
Invasive Strip Search Does Not Violate Fourth Amendment, MCQUILLIN MUN. LAW REP. May
2012, at 1.
13. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496. Florence fell behind on the sentence payments
and failed to appear at an enforcement hearing. Invasive Strip Search Does Not Violate Fourth
Amendment, supra note 12. As a result, the bench warrant was issued in Essex County for
his arrest. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
14. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496.
15. After he was stopped, Florence offered the police officer proof of a certified letter
from the State of New Jersey, dated October 2004, demonstrating that all judgments were
satisfied and no warrant existed against him. Complaint at ¶ 17, Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d
492 (D.N.J. 2009) (No. 05CV3619(JHR)), 2005 WL 2099622. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 3. Florence kept the letter accessible because he had been pulled over
in the past. Id.
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state trooper arrested Florence and took him to the Burlington Coun16
ty Detention Center (“Burlington jail”).
At the Burlington jail, Florence alleged that he was subjected to a
17
full-body strip search. While Florence was nude, the officer conducted a body cavity search by “directing [Florence] to . . . open his
18
mouth, lift his tongue, hold his arms fully out, and lift his genitals.”
19
After the observation, Florence was instructed to shower. He was
20
then detained at the Burlington jail for six days.
After the sixth day, Florence was transported to the Essex County
21
jail (“Essex jail”). Upon arrival and pursuant to facility policy, Flor22
ence was again subjected to a full body and cavity strip search. The
Essex jail officers required Florence and four other detainees to enter
23
separate shower stalls, disrobe, and shower. The officers ordered
24
the detainees to open their mouths and lift their genitals. Then the
25
officers directed the detainees to turn around, squat, and cough. Af26
terwards, “Florence was placed with the general jail population.”
The next day, the officers transported Florence to the Essex County
27
The judge dismissed all
courthouse to appear before a judge.

16. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 3–4. The county had failed to remove the warrant from the relevant computer system, so the officer continued with the
arrest. Invasive Strip Search Does Not Violate Fourth Amendment, supra note 12.
17. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496. A strip search is “[a] search of a person conducted after that person’s clothes have been removed, the purpose usu[ally] being to find
any contraband the person might be hiding.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1469 (9th ed.
2009).
18. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 496–97. The officer, sitting at arms-length in front of
Florence, did not physically touch him during the strip search. Id. at 497.
19. Id. According to officers at the Burlington Jail, visual observations of nonindictable arrestees involve the nude arrestee taking a shower with a delousing agent. See
id. at 498–99 (explaining the intake procedures based on the testimony of several Burlington Jail officers).
20. Id. at 497. During his imprisonment at the Burlington jail, Florence repeatedly
told jail personnel that the warrant against him was invalid; however, the jail made no effort to inquire into the warrant’s validity. See Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 20–24, 55.
21. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
22. Id. The policy of the Essex County jail was that all arriving arrestees, regardless of
the basis of their arrests, be strip searched while the officers observed and performed a full
body examination “including body openings.” Id. at 499. Based on the Essex jail intake
procedures, the strip search consisted of a visual observation, but not physical touching, by
the officers. Id.
23. Id. at 497.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 11, at 7. New Jersey law generally requires the county to present an arrestee to a magistrate judge for a probable cause hearing, but Burlington County never provided Florence with such a hearing. Id. at 5–6.
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charges against Florence and ordered his immediate release from cus28
tody on grounds that the warrant was invalid.
29
Florence later filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Burlington and Essex jails, as well as against several other
30
people involved in the arrest and subsequent strip searches. Specifically, Florence alleged that the defendants violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because the strip searches were unreasonable given the nature of Florence’s offense and the circumstances of his ar31
rest. Soon after the filing of the complaint, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey certified the lawsuit as a class
32
action.
After three years of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of strip
searches conducted without reasonable suspicion on non-indictable
33
detainees. The federal district court adopted the majority view of
34
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and held that the blanket policy
of strip searching non-indictable arrestees violated the Fourth

28. Id. at 7. Florence had paid the fine less than a week after his failure to appear at
the enforcement hearing. Id. at 3.
29. Section 1983 provides relief to individuals who have been deprived of their constitutional rights by state actors. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law . . . .”).
30. Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 4–12.
31. Id. at ¶¶ 39–45. In Count Three of the Complaint, Florence alleged that he “was
falsely arrested and subjected to the humiliation and degradation of a strip/body cavity
search procedure prior to any determination . . . that the . . . detention was supported by
probable cause.” Id. at ¶ 40. As such, Florence alleged that the searches were unconstitutional because there was no reasonable suspicion that he was concealing a weapon or contraband at the time of the searches. Id. at ¶¶ 43–44.
32. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 05-3619, 2008 WL 800970, at *1
(D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2008). On Florence’s motion, the district court certified a class of individuals who had been charged with non-indictable offenses under New Jersey law and who
were directed to undergo a strip search in the absence of reasonable suspicion while being
processed at either the Burlington or Essex jails. Id. at *17.
33. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d 492, 495–96 (D.N.J. 2009). Additionally, the plaintiffs
sought injunctive relief on behalf of the class. Id. at 496. The defendants, in turn, also
sought Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity for certain defendants in
their individual capacities, as well as the dismissal of plaintiffs’ § 1983 Municipality Custom
Violations Claim. Id.
34. Id. at 505–11. The district court recognized that an eight-to-three circuit split had
developed since the Bell decision. Id. at 505–07. Three circuits—the Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits—split from the majority view that reasonable suspicion must be present
before a strip search is conducted in the context of admitting new inmates. See infra Part
II.B.2.
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35

Amendment. First, the district court reasoned that the intake procedures at the Burlington and Essex jails were intrusive enough to rise
36
to the level of a “strip search.” Second, the court found that the
37
search procedures were unconstitutional under the Bell v. Wolfish
38
balancing test. Thus, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment, concluding that the Fourth Amendment forbids
a suspicionless strip search of an individual arrested for a minor offense if neither the nature nor the circumstances of the offense create
39
a reasonable suspicion of the presence of contraband.
The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the district court
40
decision with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
Third Circuit only reviewed “‘whether a blanket policy of strip searching all non-indictable arrestees admitted to a jail facility without first
articulating reasonable suspicion violate[d] the Fourth Amend41
ment.’” In its analysis, the court recognized the existence of a circuit
split as to whether non-indictable arrestees pose a security risk at the
42
time of intake.
In applying the four-prong balancing test from Bell, the Third
Circuit determined that “the scope, manner, and place of the [strip]
searches” conducted by defendants “[w]ere similar to or less intrusive
43
than those in Bell.” Furthermore, the court concluded that preven35. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
36. Id. at 502–03. The Burlington County policy made a distinction between “visual
observation” and “strip search,” whereas the Essex County policy did not. Id.
37. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). In Bell, the Supreme Court applied a four-prong balancing
test to determine whether the need for visual body-cavity inspections on detainees after
contact visits with outsiders outweighed the invasion of detainee’s personal rights. See infra
note 61 and accompanying text.
38. Florence I, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 511. The district court in Florence looked at the scope,
manner, place, and justification for the particular intrusions. Id. at 511–12. The court
reasoned that the strip procedures at both the Burlington and Essex jails invaded the personal privacy of the detainees. Id. Further, the searches took place in a shower room
where privacy was minimal. Id. Third, the manner in which the searches were conducted
was humiliating and degrading because they were conducted in the presence of other inmates. Id. Lastly, the district court found that the general security concerns justifying the
strip search policies were not enough to outweigh the invasion of privacy interests. Id. at
512–13. This Note refers interchangeably to the Bell test, the Bell balancing test, and the
Bell factors.
39. Id.
40. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 301 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Florence II]. Following the district court decision, the defendants moved the district
court to certify its summary judgment decision into an appealable order pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
42. Id. at 303–06; see also supra note 34.
43. Florence II, 621 F.3d at 307 (emphasis added); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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tion of smuggling dangerous weapons and contraband into the correctional facility was a sufficient justification for a blanket strip search
44
policy. A divided panel of the Third Circuit ultimately reversed the
decision of the district court, holding that the search procedures
conducted by defendants struck a reasonable balance between inmate
45
privacy and the security needs of the Burlington and Essex jails.
Writing in dissent, Judge Pollak concluded that it is unreasonable
for correctional officers to conduct intrusive strip searches of citizens
“‘arrested for minor offenses, such as violating a leash law or a traffic
code, [when the citizens] pose no credible risk for smuggling contraband into [a] jail’” and when there is no evidence demonstrating that
46
non-indictable arrestees tend to possess contraband. Judge Pollak
noted that jail administrators should be afforded deference in their
attempts to ensure security in jails, but he also emphasized that convicted prisoners still receive constitutional protections, such as the
“protection against forced nakedness during strip searches in front of
47
others.”
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split
regarding “whether the Fourth Amendment requires correctional officials to exempt some detainees,” such as those arrested for minor,
non-indictable crimes, from suspicionless strip search procedures be48
fore the detainees are placed in the general jail population.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
As a result of the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need to defer
to the judgment of the administrators of correctional institutions in
developing jail policies since the late 1970s, there has been a reduction in the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to inmates. Part
II.A of this Note examines the evolution of the constitutional rights of
detainees and the balancing test the Supreme Court developed to determine the reasonableness of search procedures. Part II.B illustrates
44. Florence II, 621 F.3d at 307–08.
45. Id. Although the majority recognized that the defendants had not presented any
evidence regarding the discovery of contraband on indictable and non-indictable offenders at the time of intake, the majority was still compelled by the decision in Bell. The court
noted that it is “plausible that incarcerated persons will induce or recruit others to subject
themselves to arrest on non-indictable offenses to smuggle weapons or other contraband
into the facility.” Id. at 308.
46. Florence II, 621 F.3d at 311–12 (Pollak, J., dissenting) (quoting Bull v. City and
Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
47. Id. at 312 (quoting Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (Barkett, J., dissenting)).
48. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1515 (2012).
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how federal circuit courts have developed varying interpretations of
what satisfies the reasonableness test for detainee search procedures
and how these variations have resulted in a circuit split.
A. The Evolution of Inmates’ Constitutional Rights Has Limited the
Scope of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments Protections by
Expanding the Scope of Constitutional Searches and Other Prison
Regulations
The Fourth Amendment protects people against unreasonable
49
searches. The importance of maintaining safety in correctional institutions, however, restricts the extent to which constitutional rights
50
are afforded to detainees. Courts defer to the judgment of correctional officials when determining whether a policy satisfies constitu51
tional requirements.
1. The Limited Scope of Fourth Amendment Protections
Although the Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches, the scope of the constitutional protection is not unlimited. Generally, probable cause must exist before a search warrant
is issued, and police must secure a warrant before conducting a
52
search. The Supreme Court has, however, established exceptions to
53
this rule. For instance, in Terry v. Ohio, the Court upheld warrantless
“stop and frisk” procedures as reasonable when based on “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
54
these facts reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.” The Terry decision
divided the reasonableness determination into two parts. The Court
balanced the interests of the government in conducting the stop and
frisk against “the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual
55
rights.” In addition, the Court required individualized suspicion, in
56
the form of specific and articulable facts, to justify the procedure.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50. See infra Part II.A.1.
51. See infra Part II.A.2.
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (“[T]he police must whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure . . . .”).
53. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
54. Id. at 12, 20–21.
55. See id. at 22–25 (discussing whether officers are justified in performing a limited
search of an individual’s outer clothing for weapons when there is no probable cause for
arrest).
56. Id. at 21. The specific and articulable facts requirement is also referred to as “reasonable suspicion.” See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 71 n.20 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
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The Terry court implied that without an articulable, individualized
suspicion that justifies the intrusion and is subject to review, the
57
Fourth Amendment protection is meaningless. The Supreme Court
has since extended the reach of exceptions to the warrant requirement to arrestees, justifying the constitutionality of warrantless
searches based on the need to protect officers from the risks of harm
58
they face while performing their duties.
The need to maintain safety and order at correctional institutions has limited the Fourth Amendment protections afforded to pretrial detainees. In Bell, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the
rights of pretrial detainees when they are subjected to strip searches
59
during the period of confinement prior to trial. In Bell, inmates
challenged the correctional center’s policy requiring them “to expose
their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institu60
tion.” To determine the reasonableness of the cavity searches, the
Supreme Court balanced “the need for the particular search against
the invasion of personal rights that the search entail[ed] in a four61
factor balancing test.” The Court concluded that the need to prevent weapons, drugs, and other prohibited items from being smuggled into the correctional center outweighed the resulting invasion of
62
Although the Bell Court acknowlthe inmates’ personal rights.”
63
edged that convicted prisoners retain constitutional rights, the
Court also pointed out that legitimate governmental interests can subcurring in the result) (explaining that the Terry decision permits stop and frisks “premised
on reasonable suspicion and does not require probable cause”).
57. Cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (“The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must
evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.”).
58. See, e.g., United States. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that in the
case of a lawful custodial arrest, a warrantless search of the arrestee is reasonable to detect
weapons on the suspect’s person); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (noting
that incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search of the area within the immediate reach
of the arrestee is reasonable to prevent the arrestee from obtaining or concealing a weapon).
59. 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979).
60. Id. at 558.
61. Id. at 559. The Court considered four factors to determine reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment: (1) the scope of the particular intrusion, (2) the manner in
which the intrusion is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating the intrusion, and (4)
the place of the intrusion. Id.
62. Id. at 558–60.
63. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545 (“[C]onvicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.”).
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64

ject “these rights . . . to restrictions and limitations.” Thus, the Court
in Bell held that the blanket cavity strip search policy was constitutional, even when the searches were conducted on less than probable
cause, because they were reasonably related to legitimate governmen65
tal interests.
2. The Post-Bell Progeny—Expanding the Definition of “Reasonable”
for Other Prison Regulations and Policies
The Supreme Court applied the four-factor balancing test from
Bell in subsequent cases challenging the constitutionality of strip
searches on detainees. Because of the challenges administrators face
in operating detention centers, the Court has determined that a similar, less exacting standard is appropriate for determining the constitutionality of other regulations and policies. For example, in Block v.
66
Rutherford, pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles County Central Jail
challenged two of the jail’s policies—denying contact visits with outsiders and conducting random searches of cells in the absence of the
67
cell’s occupants. Applying the Bell factors, the Court was “unwilling
to substitute [its own] judgment on these difficult and sensitive mat68
ters of institutional administration.” The Court held that the blanket search policy and prohibition on contact visits were reasonable re69
sponses by jail officials to “legitimate security concerns.”
70
Similarly, in Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court used a reasonable relationship standard for prison regulations “to determine the
constitutionality of regulations promulgated by the Missouri Division
of Corrections relating to inmate marriages and inmate-to-inmate
71
The Turner Court sought “to formulate a
mail correspondence.
standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is respon-

64. Id.
65. Id. at 560.
66. 468 U.S. 576 (1984).
67. Id. at 578–79. The pretrial detainees filed a class action lawsuit against the county
jail officials, and the district court held that the policies violated the detainees’ rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 578–79, 590.
68. Id. at 585, 588, 591.
69. Id. at 588–89, 591. Although the lower courts concluded that the blanket prohibition on contact visits was excessive in relation to the jail’s security interests, the Supreme
Court noted the difficulties involved in “selectively allowing contact visits to some.” Id. at
587–88.
70. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
71. See id. at 89 (“[S]everal factors are relevant in determining the reasonableness of
the regulation at issue[, including that] there must be a ‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify
it.” (quoting Block, 468 U.S. at 586)).
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sive both to the ‘policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner com72
plaints and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights.’” Analyz73
ing case precedent, the Court observed that “[i]n none of these [recent] ‘prisoners’ rights’ cases did the Court apply a standard of
74
heightened scrutiny.” The Court then noted that the proper inquiry
was instead “whether a prison regulation that burdens fundamental
rights is ‘reasonably related’ to legitimate penological objectives, or
75
whether it represents an ‘exaggerated response’ to those concerns.”
Applying the lesser “reasonably related” standard, the Court concluded that “[t]he prohibition on correspondence between institutions”
was constitutional because it “[w]as logically connected to . . . legiti76
mate security concerns.”
In Bell and subsequent cases challenging the constitutionality of
search policies and other prison regulations, the Supreme Court emphasized that courts should defer to the judgment of correctional officials when deciding whether a policy is reasonably related to legiti-

72. Id. at 85 (alteration in original) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406
(1974), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)). In Turner, the lower
courts applied a “strict scrutiny standard” to evaluate the constitutionality of the correspondence and marriage regulations. Id. at 83. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit concluded that the regulations failed to satisfy the strict scrutiny standard because
they “w[ere] not the least restrictive means of achieving the asserted goals of rehabilitation
and security.” Id. (quoting Safley v. Turner, 777 F.2d 1307, 1315, (8th Cir. 1985), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part sub nom. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 788 (1987)).
73. The Turner Court analyzed four cases involving prisoners’ rights: Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520 (1979) (constitutional challenges to several prison policies, including the
prohibition on receiving food and personal care packages from outside sources, mandating body-cavity searches of detainees after contact visits, and the requirement that detainees remain outside their cells during routine inspections); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (constitutional challenges to regulations prohibiting prisoner
union meetings and bulk union mailing from outside sources); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974) (constitutional challenge to a prison regulation prohibiting face-to-face media
interviews with individual inmates); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (constitutional challenge to prisoner mail censorship regulations), overruled by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).
74. Turner, 482 U.S. at 87.
75. Id. The Court determined that a less exacting standard of review applied in the
context of the constitutionality of prison regulations because of the deference afforded to
prison administrators in creating and implementing operational policies. See id. at 89
(“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests: such a standard is necessary
if ‘prison administrators . . . and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. at 128)).
76. Id. at 91. In addition, the Turner Court “f[ou]nd that the marriage restriction,
however, d[id] not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard, but rather constitute[d] an
exaggerated response to petitioners’ rehabilitation and security concerns.” Id.
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mate security interests. For example, the Supreme Court has observed that the practice of conducting random searches is an effective
tool that correctional facilities use to deter the possession of contra78
band. In Hudson v. Palmer, the Court upheld a policy of random
searches of inmate lockers and cells without reasonable suspicion
based on the argument that a general search protocol would under79
mine the security of the institution. As a result, when it comes to
searches of inmates and arrestees, courts often defer to prison admin80
istrators.
B. Circuit Courts Disagree on Whether Reasonable Suspicion Is Required
for Strip Searches to be Constitutional Under the Fourth Amendment
Bell was one of the first Supreme Court cases to address the con81
stitutional rights of pretrial detainees. Despite the four-factor reasonableness test that the Court announced in Bell, federal circuit
courts have varied in their interpretations of Bell and in their applica82
tions of the balancing test.

77. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 547 (“Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wideranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their
judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”); see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S., 576, 583–91 (1984) (relying on Bell
and deferring to the judgment of prison authorities); Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 (“[C]ourts
should be particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to corrections
officials . . . .’” (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 827)).
78. 468 U.S. 517 (1984). The inmate in Hudson claimed that a prison guard deprived
him of his right to due process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment when the
guard destroyed his property during a “shakedown search” of the prison locker. Id. at 530.
The inmate brought a separate claim alleging that the shakedown search was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the Court “conclude[d] that
prisoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and that the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.” Id. at 30.
79. Id. at 529 (“‘For one to advocate that prison searches must be conducted only pursuant to an enunciated general policy or when suspicion is directed at a particular inmate
is to ignore the realities of prison operation.’” (quoting Marreo v. Commonwealth, 284
S.E.2d 809, 811 (Va. 1981))).
80. See, e.g., Bull v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964, 982 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e
conclude that San Francisco’s policy requiring strip searches of all arrestees classified for
custodial housing in the general population was facially reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, notwithstanding the lack of individualized reasonable suspicion as to the individuals searched.”); see also infra Part II.B.1.
81. Cf. Bell, 441 U.S. at 523 (“Over the past five terms, this Court has in several decisions considered constitutional challenges to prison conditions or practices by convicted
prisoners. This case requires us to examine the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
82. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
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Several Circuit Courts Have Upheld the Constitutionality of
Blanket Strip Search Policies Under the Bell Test

The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Ninth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits have held that strip searches conducted on pretrial detainees, even in the absence of reasonable suspicion, are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment based on an application of the Bell
83
test. In Powell v. Barrett, the Eleventh Circuit held that a blanket visual strip search policy, which mandated searches on all detainees
placed into the general jail population for the first time, did not vio84
There, the five plaintiffs had been
late the Fourth Amendment.
85
charged with minor offenses. The plaintiffs argued that “there was
no reasonable suspicion to believe that any of them had hidden con86
traband.” Applying the Bell factors, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
the security concerns used to justify strip searches of inmates after
contact visits in Bell were no greater than those needed to justify visual
87
strip searches of new detainees in Powell. The Eleventh Circuit concluded thatthe blanket strip search policies did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, “provided that the searches are no more intrusive on
88
privacy interests than those upheld in the Bell case.”
The Ninth and Third Circuits soon followed the Eleventh Circuit
89
decision. In Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the constitutionality of the San Francisco Sherriff’s Department’s policy of strip searching all arrestees introduced into the gen90
91
eral jail population, overruling its own case precedent. Further83. 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008).
84. Id. at 1300.
85. Id. at 1301. The charges against the plaintiffs included the following minor offenses: “a bail revocation on a disorderly conduct charge, a traffic ticket warrant, a DUI
charge, . . . a contempt charge for failure to pay child support,” and a non-violent burglary
charge. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 1314 (“[T]here are plenty of situations where arrestees have had at least
as much opportunity to conceal contraband as would inmates on contact visits, which is
the situation in Bell.”).
88. Id.
89. 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010).
90. Id. at 982. The Ninth Circuit determined that the scope, manner, and justification
for the San Francisco policy was analogous to Bell, in which the balancing test favored the
correctional institutions safety concerns. Id. at 975. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner v. Safley required it to give greater deference
to the jail officials’ determinations of what constituted reasonable search policies. Id. at
976–77.
91. See, e.g., Thompson v. City of L.A., 885 F.2d 1439, 1445–48 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a blanket strip search policy of arrestees was per se unconstitutional), overruled by
Bull v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010); Giles v. Ackerman, 746 F.2d
614, 615 (9th Cir. 1984) (same), overruled by Bull, 595 F.3d 964. The Ninth Circuit, in Bull,

2013]

FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS

93

more, in the appellate decision in Florence, the Third Circuit held that
the blanket strip search policies implemented by the Burlington and
92
Even
Essex jails were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
more recently, the D.C. Circuit applied the Bell test in a decision that
reversed the court’s denial of summary judgment to a former U.S.
Marshal who strip searched arrested protestors upon processing them
93
into holding cells. The D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
searches on the grounds that in 2002, when the arrests and strip
searches occurred, there “was no clearly established constitutional
prohibition of strip searching arrestees without individualized, rea94
sonable suspicion.”
2. Other Circuits Have Concluded That Blanket Strip Search Policies
Are Unconstitutional When Conducted in the Absence of
Reasonable Suspicion
Other circuits have held that blanket strip search policies violate
the Fourth Amendment when conducted in the absence of individualized suspicion. Under the Bell balancing test, the First and Seventh
Circuits, for example, have found that the humiliating and dehumanizing invasiveness of strip searches outweighs correctional institutions’
95
needs for the search, especially when the alleged offense was minor.
96
In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit held that
Chicago’s policy of strip searching female misdemeanor offenders
who were not inherently dangerous and who were detained only for a
brief time was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
97
Amendment. The court noted that Bell was inapplicable because the
searches in Mary Beth G. were conducted under significantly different
circumstances: The detainees in Bell “were awaiting trial on serious
federal charges,” whereas the detainees in Mary Beth G. were arrested

concluded that previous case law failed to give appropriate weight to the Bell and Turner
factors. Bull, 595 F.3d at 977.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 40–45.
93. Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
94. Id. at 388; see also id. at 386 (“The governing precedent was then [in 2002], as it is
now, Bell v. Wolfish, and nothing in Bell requires individualized, reasonable suspicion before strip searching a person entering a detention facility.”).
95. See generally Roberts v. Rhode Island, 239 F.3d 107, 108–13 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding
that it was unconstitutional to strip search all pre-arraigned detainees charged with misdemeanors not associated with weapons or contraband, even though the detainees were
held in a maximum security facility with documented history of contraband, and they also
freely intermingled with the general prison population).
96. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1984).
97. Id. at 1273.

94

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ENDNOTES

[Vol. 72:81

98

for misdemeanor offenses. As such, the “‘need for the particular
search’” of the misdemeanants, especially in the absence of reasonable suspicion of smuggled contraband, was not “substantial
99
enough . . . to justify the severity of the governmental intrusion.”
In addition, the First Circuit has questioned correctional institutions’ justifications for conducting strip searches. For instance, in
100
Roberts v. Rhode Island, the court noted that the security concerns of
101
Thus,
the intake facility did not justify its strip search procedures.
102
the court determined that the search policies were unconstitutional.
At issue in Roberts were “[t]wo Rhode Island Department of Corrections . . . policies provid[ing] that all males committed to the state
prison be subject[ed] to a strip search and a visual body cavity
103
search.” With the federal circuit courts clearly split on the constitutionality of blanket strip searches, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Florence.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Florence, the Supreme Court held that the strip search procedures at the Burlington and Essex Jails “struck a reasonable balance
between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions” and there104
The Court found
fore comported with the Fourth Amendment.
that Florence failed to provide substantial evidence that the strip
search policies enforced by the Burlington and Essex jails “[w]ere an
105
unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security.”
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy examined the “rules or
limitations the Constitution imposes on searches of arrested persons”
106
entering the jail population. The Court explained the reasons why
“deference must be given to [correctional] officials in charge of”
98. Id. at 1272.
99. Id. at 1272–73 (citation omitted).
100. 239 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2001).
101. Roberts, 239 F.3d at 110–13. The “‘justification for initiating’” the strip search was
the concern for maintaining institutional security. Id. at 110–11. The institutional security
concerns, however, were insufficient to support the invasive strip search that forced the
detainee to display his genitals and spread his legs so officials could observe his body cavity. Id. at 110. Unlike the facility in Bell, the Rhode Island facility did not limit its searches
to prisoners who had contact with outside visitors. Id. at 111. Further, prison officials had
no reason to believe the detainee was highly dangerous or carrying weapons or contraband. Id. at 112.
102. Id. at 113.
103. Id. at 108.
104. 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012).
105. Id. at 1513–14.
106. Id. at 1513.
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conducting searches as a part of the jail intake process. In particular, the Court noted that “[t]he admission of inmates creates numerous risks for facility staff,” such as the introduction of contagious in108
fections and “grave threats posed by the increasing number of gang
109
The Court also
members who go through the intake process.”
acknowledged the serious risks involved in the ability of new detainees
110
As such, the
to smuggle “[w]eapons, drugs, and alcohol” into jail.
Supreme Court concluded that “there [is] a substantial interest” in
performing strip searches at intake to “prevent[] any new inmate . . .
from putting all who live or work at these institutions at even greater
111
risk.”
The Supreme Court next explained that creating an exemption
from strip searching certain detainees who had been arrested for mi112
nor offenses “would be unworkable.” The Court rejected Florence’s
argument that “there is little benefit to conducting [such] invasive
[searches] on a new detainee who has not been arrested for a serious
113
First, the
crime or for any offense involving a weapon or drugs.”
Court emphasized that “[p]eople detained for minor offenses can
114
turn out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals.” As a result of such uncertainties, the Court observed, it is reasonable for correctional officials to “conduct the same thorough search of everyone
115
who will be admitted to their facilities.” The Court also noted that
some “people arrested for minor offenses have tried to smuggle pro116
hibited items into jail,” by using their body cavities as concealment.
Second, the Supreme Court discussed the issues involved in classifying and exempting certain detainees from standard strip search

107. Id. at 1518.
108. Id. (discussing “[t]he danger of introducing lice or contagious infections” during
the admission of inmates).
109. Id. at 1518–19. The Court observed that during the intake process, gang members
may “recruit new inmates by force,” and that feuding gangs can engage in deadly fights,
putting the officers at risk. Id. at 1518–19. The Court determined that “[t]hese considerations . . . justify a visual inspection for certain tattoos and other signs of gang affiliation as
part of the intake process.” Id. at 1519.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1520.
112. Id.
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Id. As an example, the Court noted that Timothy McVeigh, the man responsible
for the Oklahoma City bombings, “was stopped by a state trooper [for] driving without a
license plate” a short time after the bombing. Id. Similarly, one of the terrorists involved
in the 9/11 terrorist attack “was stopped and ticketed for speeding just two days” prior to
the terrorist attacks. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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procedures based on the degree of their offenses.
The Court explained that “[t]he officers who conduct an initial search often do not
have access to criminal history records” of arrestees, and that the
118
“records can be inaccurate or incomplete.” Additionally, the Court
noted that it would be hard to implement exceptions for nonindictable detainees because officers would be required to quickly determine “whether any of the [arrestees’] underlying offenses were se119
The Court
rious enough to authorize invasive search protocol.”
predicted that officers may be less inclined to conduct a strip search
when it is difficult to determine the severity of the underlying offense,
120
which could result in unnecessary risks to the jail population. Thus,
the Court concluded that exempting certain detainees from strip
searches during intake, solely based on their having committed minor
offenses, would increase the danger already present in detention facil121
ities.
Writing in separate concurring opinions, Chief Justice Roberts
122
However, they stressed
and Justice Alito agreed with the majority.
that the Court “d[id] not foreclose the possibility of an exception to
the rule” in the future; in other words, the Court should “not hold
that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an ar123
restee.”
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, wrote that the Fourth Amendment forbids an officer from conducting a strip “search of an individual arrested for a minor offense that does not involve drugs or violence,”
when the officer does not “have reasonable suspicion to believe that
124
Justice Breyer exthe individual possesses drugs or contraband.”
plained that “the place, scope and manner” of the strip searches in
Florence were “a serious invasion of privacy” because they “involve[d]
125
close observation of the private areas of a person’s body.” The dis117. Id. at 1521–22.
118. Id. at 1521. The Court pointed out that Florence’s criminal record did not include his previous arrest for possession of a deadly weapon. Id.
119. Id. at 1521–22.
120. Id. at 1522.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524–25 (Alito, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1525–26 (“[T]he kind of strip search in question involves more than undressing and taking a shower (even if guards monitor the shower area for threatened disorder). Rather, the searches here involve close observation of the private areas of a person’s body and for that reason constitute a far more serious invasion of that person’s
privacy.”).
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sent noted other instances in which individuals arrested for minor offenses were subjected to a visual strip search to emphasize the degradation and humiliation that can result from such an invasion of priva126
cy.
Although Justice Breyer acknowledged “that prison regulations
that interfere with important constitutional interests are generally valid as long as they are ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,’” he concluded that the strip searches in Florence lacked such
127
justification. Justice Breyer noted that the “first two penological interests advanced” in favor of strip searches—“(1) to detect injuries or
diseases [and] (2) to identify gang tattoos”—could be satisfied
128
Further, the dissent noted that
through other intake procedures.
there was no justification for the third penological interest—“to detect contraband”—due to “the small number of ‘incidents’” in which
inmates have been discovered to have concealed contraband at the
129
Moreover, the dissent highlighted the laws in
time of admission.
various states that prohibit suspicionless strip searches to demonstrate
that the application of a reasonable suspicion standard does not “interfer[e] with the legitimate penal interest in preventing the smug130
gling of contraband.” Overall, Justice Breyer found that case precedent cited by the majority did not adequately justify the exercise of
strip searches of detainees arrested for minor offenses in the absence of
131
reasonable suspicion.
IV. ANALYSIS
In Florence, the Supreme Court held that correctional institutions
may conduct suspicionless strip searches of every arrestee introduced
into the general jail population, even when the arrestee allegedly
132
The Court reasoned that the strip
committed a minor offense.
searches performed on Florence struck a reasonable balance between
respecting his privacy rights and maintaining the security needs of the

126. Id. at 1526–27. The dissent cited to instances involving the strip search of women
who were lactating, menstruating, or had been sexually assaulted. Id. at 1527.
127. Id. at 1527 (citation omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1528.
130. Id. at 1529–31.
131. Id. at 1530–31. The dissent noted that the majority did not “set forth any example
of an instance in which contraband was smuggled into the general jail population during
intake that could not have been discovered if the jail was employing a reasonable suspicion
standard.” Id. at 1530.
132. Id. at 1523 (majority opinion).
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133

Burlington and Essex jails.
In so holding, however, the Court im134
properly analogized Florence’s case to Bell. The Florence Court also
afforded too much discretion to jail officials in determining the rea135
Rather than provide nearly unsonableness of search procedures.
limited discretion to correctional institutions, the Court should have
applied the ABA standards, which adopt a reasonable suspicion
136
standard for conducting strip searches.
A. The Florence Court Improperly Interpreted the Bell Balancing Test
in Determining the Reasonableness of Strip Searches of Detainees
The Supreme Court improperly applied the Bell balancing test to
the facts of Florence. The Court’s reliance on Bell was misplaced because the circumstances in Florence were highly distinguishable from
137
Proper application of the Bell balancing test to the
those in Bell.
facts of Florence demonstrates that the particular needs for the strip
searches of Florence were heavily outweighed by the severe intrusion
138
on his privacy rights.
1. The Unique Facts of Florence Did Not Warrant Heavy Reliance
on Bell as a Basis for the Supreme Court’s Decision
The circumstances surrounding the strip searches in Florence were
distinct from those in Bell and should have resulted in a different outcome before the Supreme Court. First, Florence, unlike the detainees in Bell, was a new detainee to the facility when he was strip
139
In Bell, “the detainees were already confined” and were
searched.

133. See supra Part III.
134. See infra Part IV.A.
135. See infra Part IV.B.
136. See infra Part IV.C. Most states have adopted the ABA standards to determine the
reasonableness of invasive strip searches. There are other organizations that set out similar, if not identical, standards. For example, the American Correctional Association has
promulgated a standard that forbids strip searches of arrestees during intake in the absence of “reasonable belief or suspicion” of the possession of contraband. CORE JAIL
STANDARDS
1-CORE-2C-02,
(Am.
Corr.
Ass’n
2010),
available
at
www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc012203.pdf. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Justice has published standards, which include a section on detainee searches,
that are designed for use in reviewing non-federal facilities that have federal detainees to
ensure “these facilities . . . protect . . . constitutional rights.” FEDERAL PERFORMANCEBASED DETENTION STANDARDS 1, 37 (Office of the Fed. Det. Tr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/ofdt/fpbds02232011.pdf.
137. See infra Part IV.A.1.
138. See infra Part IV.A.2.
139. Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 16,
Florence II, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No 10-945), 2011 WL2578557.
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“strip searched after contact visits” with outside visitors.
The Bell
Court noted that the strip searches were reasonable, in part, because
141
the inmates posed “a greater risk to jail security and order.” In contrast, Florence had merely been arrested for a minor infraction and
was strip searched upon being processed for entry into both the Bur142
lington and Essex jails. Florence was arrested shortly after his vehicle was stopped; he had neither the opportunity nor the motive to
143
smuggle contraband into the Burlington and Essex jails.
Second, the nature of Florence’s offense did not justify the invasive strip searches implemented. As Justice Breyer noted in dissent,
“[p]rison regulations that interfere with important constitutional interests are generally valid as long as they are ‘reasonably related to le144
In
gitimate penological interests,’” such as detecting contraband.
Bell, the Supreme Court noted that post-contact visit strip searches
were reasonably related to “maintaining institutional security,” which
justified searching “both convicted prisoners and pretrial detain145
The Court recognized that pretrial detainees were often
ees.”
“charged with serious crimes” or had prior criminal records, and thus
146
posed security risks as great as those posed by convicted inmates.
The strip searches of Florence, however, were not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests because Florence’s offense
147
did not involve violence or drugs. The dissenting opinion in Florence

140. Id.
141. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 & n.28 (1979). In Bell, there was a concern that
inmates would try to smuggle contraband received from outside visitors. Id. at 558–59. In
addition, the Court suggested that it was reasonable to conduct strip searches on all detainees, including “those who are detained prior to trial,” because they are often “charged
with serious crimes or . . . have prior records” and therefore “may pose a greater risk of
escape that convicted inmates.” Id. at 546 n.28.
142. See supra Part I.
143. Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 139, at 16 (“[D]etainees like Mr. Florence, who are accused of minor offenses, are
unlikely to have the motive or opportunity to plan to be arrested with contraband hidden
on their persons for the purpose of smuggling it into a prison.”).
144. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1527–28 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
145. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 & n.28 (noting that there “[w]as no basis for concluding
that pretrial detainees pose any lesser security risk than convicted inmates”); see also supra
note 141 and accompanying text.
146. Bell, 441 U.S. at 546 & n.28; see also supra note 141 and accompanying text.
147. See Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1530–32 (discussing state laws and federal appellate
court decisions that forbid strip searches in the absence of reasonable suspicion that the
arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband). In this instance, Florence was arrested for
a minor traffic offense, which did not give the state trooper any reason to believe he was
violent or carrying a concealed weapon or drugs. See supra note 143 and accompanying
text.
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correctly noted that the Bell Court, in implementing a post-contactvisit blanket strip search policy, “had no occasion to focus upon those
arrested for minor crimes, prior to a judicial officer’s determination
148
Florence,
that [the detainee] should be committed to prison.”
however, was not presented to a magistrate judge, even though one
149
Florence was unwas available, until a week after his detainment.
fairly detained without having received determination from a judicial
officer that was required to commit Florence to prison. Overall, the
circumstances of Florence’s case were very different from those in Bell
and did not warrant the strip searches. Thus, Bell did not provide sufficient justification for the Florence majority’s proposition that the
judgment of correctional officers is enough to implement an invasive
150
strip search policy without reasonable suspicion.
2. The Asserted Needs for the Strip Searches in Florence Did Not
Outweigh the Invasion of Personal Privacy Rights
In its application of the Bell balancing test, the Florence majority
incorrectly concluded that the asserted need for the two strip searches
151
To comply
outweighed the invasion of Florence’s personal rights.
with the Fourth Amendment, searches must be reasonable in scope
152
In past cases, the Supreme Court has recogand in intrusiveness.
nized the humiliating and dehumanizing nature of strip searches sim153
ilar to those performed on Florence. In addition, federal appellate
courts have described strip search practices as “‘demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrass154
ing, [and] repulsive, signifying degradation and submission.’” The
invasive and degrading nature of these strip searches must be bal-

148. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1531.
149. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
150. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1531–32.
151. See supra Part III.
152. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 (“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition . . . it requires a balancing of the need for the
particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”); see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (“[T]he central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment [is] the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”).
153. See, e.g., Safford United Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009)
(“The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place
a search that intrusive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.”);
Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 (“We do not underestimate the degree to which these searches may
invade the personal privacy of inmates.”).
154. Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
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anced carefully with the actual security risks used to justify each search
155
to uphold the constitutionality of the procedures.
In the absence of a reasonable suspicion standard, the strip
search of Florence did not outweigh the severe invasion of his privacy
rights. First, the purported need for a strip search—especially on two
different occasions—was unreasonable when weighed against the actual security risks Florence posed. The Bell Court noted that it was
reasonable for jail officials to be suspicious of detainees who had con156
tact with outside visitors; thus, there was a substantial basis for the
decision to strip search all detainees who voluntarily chose to meet
157
with visitors. Neither the Florence majority nor the dissent dismissed
the difficulties in managing a correctional institution and the need to
158
Yet, the dissent corminimize the spread of disease and violence.
rectly determined that there was a lack of evidence to support strip
searches of those arrested for minor offenses based on the need to
159
For example, alternative
preserve and maintain prison security.
methods were available to search Florence and assure that he would

155. Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 139, at 7–8 (emphasis added).
156. See supra Part II.A.1. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell, the dissent
in Bull v. City of San Francisco noted that “[a]s a matter of common sense, contact visits are
far more likely to lead to smuggling than initial arrests.” 595 F.3d 964, 998 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
157. In contrast, individuals like Florence typically do not know that they are about to
be arrested and, thus, have even less of an opportunity to hide contraband. See Shain v.
Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Unlike persons already in jail who receive contact
visits, arrestees do not ordinarily have notice that they are about to be arrested and thus an
opportunity to hide something.”). As the dissenting judge in the Third Circuit opinion in
Florence noted, “[o]ne might doubt that individuals would deliberately commit minor offenses such as civil contempt . . . and then secrete contraband on their person, all in the
hope that they will, at some future moment, be arrested and taken to jail to make their
illicit deliveries.” Florence II, 621 F.3d, 296, 312 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010) (Pollack, J., dissenting).
158. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1527–28 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at
1520 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent focused on the lack of a justification for strip searches with respect to detecting contraband. The dissent cited to “a study
of 23,000 persons admitted to the Orange County correctional facility [in New York] between 1999 and 2003.” Id. According to the study, of the “23,000 persons [who] underwent a strip search of the kind described” in Florence, “the County encountered three incidents of drugs recovered from an inmate’s anal cavity and two incidents of drugs falling
from an inmate’s underwear.” Id. (citation omitted). Justice Breyer noted that the results
of the study revealed “that in four of these five instances there may have been reasonable
suspicion to search, leaving only one instance in 23,000 in which the strip search policy
‘arguably’ detected additional contraband” in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Id.
(citing Dodge v. Cnty. of Orange, 282 F. Supp. 2d 41, 69–70 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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pose no security risks prior to admission into the general jail popula160
tion.
Furthermore, the invasion of Florence’s privacy happened on two
separate occasions—at the Burlington jail and then again upon trans161
fer to the Essex jail. Florence was strip searched upon entering the
Burlington jail to ensure that he would not pose a threat to the general jail population and then was detained there for six days. There
was very little evidence provided as to why it was necessary for him to
undergo a second strip search upon transfer to the Essex jail. If reasonable suspicion was the standard implemented at the time Florence
arrived at the Essex jail, it is unlikely that correctional officials would
162
Thus, the invasive and dehave performed a second strip search.
grading nature of the two strip searches clearly outweighed the minimal security risks offered to justify the search of Florence on either
occasion.
B. By Not Implementing a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, the Florence
Court Afforded Almost Unlimited Discretion to Correctional Facilities
at the Expense of Detainees’ Constitutional Rights
In Florence, the Supreme Court granted correctional facilities
nearly unlimited power to create and implement regulations. Although the Court’s decision resolved a significant circuit split, the decision will likely lead to abuse in the correctional system. In the past,
“[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly granted considerable deference
163
to corrections officials in reviewing of jail administration policies.”
In the absence of a reasonable suspicion standard for strip searches,
however, such searches are conducted in an indiscriminate manner,
not only in the context of detainees searched during intake procedures at correctional institutions, but also in the context of school
164
In addition, the Supreme
searches and gender-based searches.
160. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, “searches already employed at Essex and
Burlington include[d]: (a) pat-frisking all inmates; (b) making inmates go through metal
detectors . . .; (c) making inmates shower and use particular delousing agents or bathing
supplies; and (d) searching inmates’ clothing.” Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1528.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 17–28.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 159–160; see also Florence III, 132 S. Ct. at 1528–
32 (discussing the lack of justification for the strip searches of Florence pointing to the
reasonable suspicion standard recommended by professional bodies and implemented in
many states).
163. See generally The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Leading Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 206,
211–12 (2012) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977); and Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1975)).
164. See generally Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (considering the constitutionality of a strip search performed by school officials on an eighth
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Court’s practice of deferring to correctional officials has been overly
broad and poorly defined, causing confusion among lower courts and
165
resulting in a circuit split.
Even though the Court’s decision may increase the effectiveness
of safety procedures at correctional facilities, the Florence decision will
ultimately result in the erosion of constitutional protections afforded
to detainees. One of “[t]he most remarkable aspect[s] of the [Florence] ruling was the Court’s [heavy] reliance on the expertise of corrections officials, without any scrutiny of their [judgment] in develop166
With unlimited deference,
ing a prison’s strip search policy.”
correctional facilities are likely to implement “more invasive policies,
which will decrease the incentive for prisoners to bring . . . constitu167
tional challenges” to their treatment. The post-Bell cases focused on
whether detainees have any privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment, and the Supreme Court has strictly limited the scope of the
168
In HudFourth Amendment as it applies in correctional facilities.
son, Justice Stevens in a concurring and a dissenting opinion, argued
that the Court’s policy of deference encouraged it to “overlook[] the
169
purpose of a written Constitution.” The Court’s decision in Florence
abrogated the reasonable suspicion standard for conducting strip
searches, thus turning a blind eye to the Fourth Amendment rights of
detainees.

grader suspected of selling painkillers); Mary Beth G. v. Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.
1984) (detailing the Chicago policy of strip searching female arrestees while only hand
frisking male arrestees).
165. The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 163, at 212–13. Giving unlimited deference to jail officials fails to provide lower federal courts with guidance in cases similar to Florence. Such an “‘open-ended’ standard allows courts to decide cases based
only on their policy preferences and also result[s] in circuit splits on policies and doctrine.” Id. at 213.
166. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 213.
168. See Loui Itoh, Note, “Hands-off” the Solicitor General: Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders and the Supreme Court’s Deference in Prison Cases, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 251, 263
& n.82 (2012) (citing Deborah L. MacGregor, Note, Stripped of All Reasons? The Appropriate
Standard for Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional Facilities,
36 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 163, 174 (2003)).
169. See 468 U.S. 517, 556–57 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The Court’s conclusive presumption that all conduct by prison guards is reasonable is . . . a decision to sacrifice constitutional principle to the Court’s own assessment of
administrative expediency.”); see also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I am concerned about the Court’s apparent
willingness to substitute the rhetoric of judicial deference for meaningful scrutiny of constitutional claims in the prison setting.”).
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C. The ABA’s Reasonable Suspicion Standard Provides Better Fourth
Amendment Protection for Pretrial Detainees
The ABA’s reasonable suspicion standard provides more protection of pretrial detainees’ constitutional rights than does the Supreme
Court’s decision in Florence regarding blanket strip search policies. 170
Every year approximately 13,000,000 Americans are arrested—roughly
171
A blanket strip search policy assumes
700,000 for minor offenses.
that all arrestees, regardless of the basis for arrest, may possess and
172
This policy defeats the purpose of having lesmuggle contraband.
gitimate penological needs for policies implemented by correctional
institutions.
Rather than approve a blanket strip search policy, the Supreme
Court should have implemented a reasonable, individualized suspicion standard to strike an effective balance between a detainee’s pri173
vacy rights and prison security concerns. Reasonable suspicion is a
relatively low standard, so it is highly unlikely that such a standard
174
At the
would hinder the security efforts of correctional facilities.
same time, the standard would provide at least some protection for
the privacy interests at stake for individuals arrested for minor offenses.
The Supreme Court should have incorporated ABA Standard 23175
7.9 concerning “searches of prisoners’ bodies,” which carefully balances detainee privacy rights with the security needs of correctional

170. See Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 139, at 15–17 (explaining that the reasonable suspicion standard preserves the
constitutional requirement that searches under the Fourth Amendment be reasonable).
171. PBS NewsHour: Supreme Court Upholds Inmate Strip Searches Regardless of Charges (PBS
television broadcast Apr. 2, 2012), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb
/law/jan-june12/scotus_04-02.html.
172. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
173. See Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 139, at 4–11 (discussing how “[t]he ABA standard on strip searches strikes the
proper balance between personal rights and prison security”).
174. Reasonable suspicion requires only “‘a minimal level of objective justification’”
and that an “officer . . . be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch’” that the detainee has contraband. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123–24 (2000) (citations omitted).
175. STANDARDS ON TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-7.9 (2011). ABA Standard 237.9(d) specifically addresses strip searches of prisoners. The term “‘prisoner’ means any
person incarcerated in a correctional facility,” including jails and prisons. STANDARDS ON
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-1.0(i)–(k). A “‘jail’ means a correctional facility holding
primarily pretrial detainees and . . . prisoners sentenced to a term of one year or less.” Id.
§ 23-1.0(i).

2013]

FLORENCE v. BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS

105

176

facilities.
The American Bar Association Standard 23-7.9(d) provides that individuals arrested and detained for minor, nonviolent,
non-drug-related offenses should be strip searched only when there is
“individualized reasonable suspicion” that the prisoner is carrying
177
Several jurisdictions have implemented statutes that
contraband.
178
mimic the ABA strip search policy. The Federal Bureau of Prisons
and numerous states impose an individualized suspicion standard
179
whenever a minor offense is involved. In addition, some jurisdictions
require the individualized suspicion standard for strip searches conducted on individuals arrested for any crime, regardless of whether
180
Ultimately, “ABA Standard 23the crime was considered “minor.”
7.9(d) sets out a practical, workable alternative to permitting a strip
search of anyone placed in a detention facility, regardless of the in181
fraction alleged.”
In Florence, Justice Breyer’s dissent made an even more convincing and logical case for applying a reasonable suspicion standard to
strip searches performed on detainees who have committed minor
182
The act of being strip searched is humiliating,183 especially
crimes.
176. Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 139, at 4.
177. The relevant text of ABA Standard 23-7.9(d) reads as follows:
Visual searches of prisoner’s bodily areas . . . should . . . be permitted only upon
individualized suspicion that the prisoner is carrying contraband, unless the
prisoner has recently had an opportunity to obtain contraband, as upon admission to the facility . . . upon return from outside the facility, after a contact visit,
or when the prisoner has otherwise had contact with a member of the general
public; provided that a strip search should not be permitted without individualized reasonable suspicion when the prisoner is an arrestee charged with a minor
offense not involving drugs or violence and the proposed strip search is upon
the prisoner’s admission to a correctional facility or before the prisoners placement in a housing unit.
Id. § 23-7.9(d)(ii).
178. See Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 139, at 12–14. For example, under the California Penal Code:
No person arrested and held in custody on a misdemeanor or infraction offense,
except those involving weapons, controlled substances or violence . . . shall be
subjected to a strip search or visual body cavity search prior to placement in the
general jail population, unless a peace officer has determined there is reasonable
suspicion based on specific and articulable facts to believe such person is concealing a weapon or contraband, and a strip search will result in the discovery of
the weapon or contraband.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4030(f) (West 2012).
179. Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra
note 139, at 13.
180. Id. at 14.
181. Id.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 124–131.
183. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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when the offense that led to the strip search was minor, such as driv184
The Florence
ing with a noisy muffler or failing to wear a seatbelt.
Court was more focused on appeasing the interests of the govern185
ment than on maintaining a balance between security in correctional facilities and the privacy rights of individuals.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Florence v. Board of Freeholders
approved a blanket policy that allows strip searches to be conducted
on all arrestees, even on those arrested for the most mundane offens186
At least seven federal appellate courts agreed with Florence’s
es.
argument that the U.S. Constitution prohibits strip searches of people
arrested for minor offense charges in the absence of reasonable suspi187
Yet, the Supreme Court focused more on the difficulties of
cion.
maintaining safety at correctional institutions and granted nearly unlimited deference to the judgment of correctional officials in deter188
The Court’s decision in Florence immining strip search policies.
plies that the final word of correctional officials will receive more
weight than the words of the Fourth Amendment, potentially opening
a gateway to transforming correctional facilities into Fourth Amend189
Rather than approving a blanket policy, the Sument-free zones.
preme Court should have implemented a reasonable, individualized
suspicion standard in order to strike an effective balance between a
detainee’s privacy rights and prison security concerns; this action
would have preserved the limited constitutional rights afforded to de190
tainees.

184. See supra text accompanying note 46; see also Adam Cohen, Strip Searches: The Supreme Court’s Disturbing Decision, TIME.COM (Apr. 6, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/04
/06/strip-searches-the-supreme-courts-disturbing-decision/ (“[W]hen the government can
strip-search people who do not wear a seat belt, it can strip-search any of us.”).
185. Cohen, supra note 184 (“[W]hen there is a case in which the freedom at stake is
crystal clear—the right to not be forced to needlessly lift one’s genitals or squat while
coughing for a law-enforcement official—the court is firmly focused on the government’s
important interests in taking it away.”).
186. Id. (“It might seem that in the United States, being pulled over for driving without
a seat belt should not end with the government ordering you to take off your clothes and
‘lift your genitals.’ But there is no guarantee that this is the case . . . .”).
187. Florence III, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1530 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. See supra Part IV.A.
189. See supra Part IV.B.
190. See supra Part IV.C.

